Md. Abdullah-Al-Mamun

The intricate relationship between Bangladesh and China has evolved into a significant geopolitical phenomenon, yet its profound implications are often misunderstood or overlooked. While China’s global ambitions under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have received considerable attention, Bangladesh’s strategic importance within this framework is yet to be fully explored. Unlike the oft-repeated narrative of a simple economic and military alliance, the Bangladesh-China relationship is characterized by a complex interplay of historical, political, and economic factors that reveal a deeper challenge to USA interests in South Asia. My goal is to investigate these under-explored dynamics. It will offer an original perspective on how this bilateral relationship impacts not just Bangladesh and China, but the broader contours of global geopolitics.

Bangladesh’s relationship with China cannot be accurately understood without a historical context (since 1975 to continue) that predates modern infrastructure projects and diplomatic exchanges. Unlike many other South Asian nations ( except Pakistan), Bangladesh did not develop its relations with China during the early years of the Cold War ( USA and its alliance versus the USSR and its alliance Warsaw Pact) but only after it gained independence from Pakistan ( West Pakistan then) in 1971. It was not until 1976, five years after its independence, that Bangladesh formally established diplomatic relations with China.

Political and Economic Statistics indicate that, at the time, both countries were primarily interested in low-level diplomatic and economic exchanges, with China viewing Bangladesh as a neutral but potentially strategic partner in a region heavily influenced by India and the Soviet Union. This early relationship actually laid the groundwork for the evolving dynamic seen today. Over time, as China began to emerge as a global power in the 1990s and 2000s, its relationship with Bangladesh also matured.

This relationship is gradually encompassing sectors beyond trade and diplomacy. One of the prime examples is: inclusion of Bangladesh in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016—which is outright marking and indicating the beginning of a period of large-scale Chinese investment in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ports, and energy sectors. Chinese involvement in much-publicized Padma Bridge and the establishment of special economic zones have made it clear. These developments transformed the relationship into one that is now viewed as mutually beneficial by both nations. Simultaneously, this bilateral relationship has also raised eyebrows internationally, particularly in Washington.

Even the infrastructure development narrative does not fully encapsulate the strategic depth of the relationship. China’s engagement with Bangladesh extends into military cooperation. Beijing has already supplied Dhaka numerous military hardware and technology. The rising defense ties between the two countries are often cited as a point of concern for the USA and India. By doing so, China is cementing its presence in the Bay of Bengal. Joint military exercises and naval cooperation between two countries have added a layer in long-term relationship, a matter of concern for the regional security. In this context, Bangladesh serves as a key node in China’s broader geostrategic ambitions. Bangladesh is allowing it to counterbalance India’s dominance in South Asia and challenge USA impact in the region.

The rising Bangladesh-China relationship presents a significant challenge to the USA’s strategic interests in South Asia. Washington has long viewed the region as a critical area for maintaining global trade routes and ensuring regional security. China’s expanding impact in Bangladesh poses a direct challenge to USA efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region. While the USA remains a key trading partner for Bangladesh (the country where Bangladesh exports the maximum RMG products), its engagement in the country’s infrastructure development has been minimal compared to China’s involvement. This has left a vacuum that Beijing has been quick to fill, directly and passively.

One of the unexplored or least researched dimensions of this geopolitical puzzle is the potential for Bangladesh to become a focal point in the broader USA-China rivalry in Asia. While much attention has been focused on China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asian nations, Bangladesh’s strategic importance is often overlooked. The Bay of Bengal, where Bangladesh is located, is a vital waterway for global trade and energy supplies. China’s rising presence in this region (through its military cooperation with Bangladesh and its investment in key infrastructure projects such as the deep-sea port at Payra) may give Beijing a significant strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean. This may undermine USA efforts to maintain its impact in the region and ensure the security of critical maritime routes.

In response to China’s growing influence in Bangladesh, the USA has taken steps to strengthen its engagement with Dhaka through initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy and soft power. Through these, the USA has sought to promote closer economic, military, and diplomatic ties with Bangladesh. However, compared to China’s large-scale infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, these efforts have so far been limited in scope though there is a great trade between two countries (around 10% RMG sold in the USA). Therefore, what the need is: the USA will have to adopt a more comprehensive approach, along with trade facilitation, if it hopes to counterbalance, at least to mitigate, China’s influence in Bangladesh. This may include increasing investment in infrastructure development, enhancing military cooperation, and promoting democratic governance and human rights. Traditionally, the USA underscore in these particular areas, a comparative advantage.

The writer is a, Research Assistant Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh